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insured from reinstating the wife either by renaming her as the bene-
ficiary or by will where the policy becomes payable to his estate. This
statute has the advantage or requiring a statement of intention im-
mediately, rather than leaving the insurance question open for sub-




Although courts of equity generally require rigid adherence to the
express terms of the trust,' the power of equity to authorize the trustee
to deviate from the trust instrument under proper circumstances is well
established.2 This may be done when an emergency arises that threat-
ens the main purpose of the trust. 3 The general principle being
acknowledged, the critical question is what circumstances actually
do create an emergency warranting deviation.
In inflationary periods beneficiaries may feel that a change in
economic conditions is alone sufficient to create an emergency. In
Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.,4 a testamentary trust
expressly limited the trustees to investing and reinvesting the trust
property in "bonds of the United States Government, in bonds of the
States of the United States, and municipalities thereof, and such
other bonds (the bonds of foreign governments or foreign munici-
'Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 6o
Ariz. 286, 136 P.2d 458 (1943); Bryson v. Bryson, 62 Cal. App. 170, 216 Pac. 391
(1923); Cannon v. Stephens, 18 Del. Ch. 276, 159 Ad. 234 (1932); Sheets v. Security
First Mortgage Co., 293 Il. App. 222, 12 N.E.2d 324 (1937); 4 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence § 1o62 (5th ed. 1941).
2"This power resides in the Court of Chancery as a part of its original inherent
jurisdiction-its general administrative jurisdiction in cases of trusts." New Jersey
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Lincoln Mortgage & Title Guaranty Co., io5 N.J.
Eq. 557, 148 Ati. 713, 715 (193o). Weakley v. Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S.W. 927
(1917); In re New, [19oi] 2 Ch. 534; 2 Scott, Trusts § 167 (2d ed. 1956). This power
is somewhat akin to the cy pres doctrine applicable to charitable trusts. Note, 28
Calif. L. Rev. 785 (1940).
sThe proposition was colorfully stated by the court in Curtis v. Brown, 29
Ill. 201, 230 (1862): "Can it be said that the beneficiary of an estate which would
bring in the market one hundred thousand dollars, should perish in the streets from
want or be forced to the poor house for support .... because there is no power in
the courts to relieve against the provisions of the instrument creating this trust?"
54 Am. Jur., Trusts § 284 (1945); Restatement, Trusts § 167 (1935).
'31o P.2d 1oo (Cal. App. 1957).
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palities excluded) as shall be rated at least 'AA' by Moody Investor's
Service, or in the event such service shall no longer be in existence,
by such first class service as such trustees shall deem best."5 An action
was brought by all life beneficiaries, their children and one of the
two truste s to secure modification of this provision so as to permit the
trustees to invest and reinvest in securities permitted by the California
Civil Code.6 The petitioner alleged that there had been a change of
economic conditions since the execution of the testamentary trust in
193o, which change was not anticipated by the settlor, and that should
the restrictions on investments be enforced, the changed circumstances
might very well substantially impair the main purpose of the trust,
which was to provide the beneficiaries with the largest income con-
sonant with safe investment. The beneficiaries pointed out that the
trust was executed during the depression when investment in stocks
was considered unwise, and that since that time there has been a
radical change in the investment situation brought about by the cur-
rent inflationary trend. The cestuis contended that during inflationary
periods investment in stocks is desirable because such stock will in-
crease in value and will presumably constitute a hedge against in-
flation. In furtherance of the petitioner's cause it was shown that
the settlor was not inherently adverse to investing in stocks. This was
obvious from the fact that the residue of his estate contained many
stocks, both preferred and common. In accord with the contentions of
the petitioners the trial court entered judgment ordering that the pro-
vision restricting investments to bonds be amended so as to permit
the trustees to invest in securities approved by the California Civil
Code.7 The appellate court, however, reversed the trial court, hold-
ing that where no emergency exists, or is threatened, a deviation
from the terms of the trust instrument should not be permitted. The
appellate court pointed out that the distributable annual income
as well as the corpus of the trust estate had increased substantially
in value since 1936. Therefore, in the absence of any showing that the
cestuis were in real need, the court declared that it could not guess
at what future economic conditions would be and that it was loath
to disregard the conclusions of the settlor as to what constituted
proper and wise investments.
The Stanton decision would seem to fall within the scope of the
generally accepted doctrine that equity has no authority to make
1Id. at 1012.
"Cal. Civ. Code § 2261 (1949).
71 bid.
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over a trust merely to gain for the cestui a better gift than was pro-
vided by the settlor.8 Under this view, the power to permit deviation
by the trustee should be limited to cases of grave emergency. In
short, a court should not modify a trust instrument simply because the
court thinks it can do a better job than the settlor did. In Thompson
v. Union National Bank in Kansas City9 the testator created a trust
of personal property with income payable to his wife and children.
For many years the trust estate produced an annual income of from
$3,6oo to $4,8oo, but finally declined to $1,3oo. In an effort to gain
more income the beneficiaries brought an action against the corporate
trustees seeking a deviation from the express terms of the trust as to
allowable investments. It was urged by these beneficiaries that the
testator had in mind the economic conditions prevailing in 1913
when his will was executed and did not anticipate that quality bonds,
then drawing 52 to 6 per cent interest, would, in years to come, earn
3 per cent or less. But the court, following the prevailing rule, refused
to employ its power of alteration merely to increase the benefits for
the present cestui.
Some courts, however, have felt that a change of economic con-
ditions in itself creates an emergency sufficient to warrant a devia-
tion from the terms of the trust.10 In St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Ghio,1" the testator directed that the trust funds be invested in mort-
gage notes or sound bonds returning at least 4 per cent interest.
Upon a showing that such investments could not produce a return of 4
per cent the court in the St. Louis case permitted the trustee to in-
vest in other securities that would produce 4 per cent interest. A
similar decision was reached in Citizens' National Bank v. Morgan,'2
sRogers v. English, 13o Conn. 332, 3 A.2d 540 (1943) (the trustee was not per-
mitted to invest the trust money in United States bonds or other trust investments
contrary to the terms of the trust, when it was shown that investments in mortgages
on realty did not jeopardize the interests of the estate); In re Jones' Will, 221 Minn.
524, 22 N.W.2d 633 (1946) (the court refused to authorize deviation from the terms
of a testamentary trust so as to permit the trustee to invest in common or pre-
ferred stock merely to increase the income to the life tenant); National Bank of
Tacoma v. Roberts, 172 Wash. 355, 20 P.2d 25 (1933) (where testamentary trust di-
rected trustee to allow beneficiaries S5oo per month for support and education,
trustee did not have discretionary power to allow more); 3 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 561 (1946).
"291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. App. 1956).
"In re Pulitzer's Estate, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y. Supp. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), aff'd
mem., 237 App. Div. 8o8, 26o N.Y. Supp. 975 (1st Dep't 1932); Weld v. Weld, 23
R.I. 311, 50 Atl. 490 (191o); In re New, [i9oi ] 2 Ch. 534. See also Annot., 17o A.L.R.
1219, 1230-33 (1947).
11240 Mo. App. 1o33, 222 S.W.2d 556 (1949).
794 N.I. 284, 51 A.2d 841 (1947).
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where the trustee was directed to invest the trust funds in bank de-
posits. It was held that due to changed economic conditions which
reduced the rate of return on bank deposits from 4 to 2 per cent the
trustee should be permitted to invest in various other legal trust in-
vestments.
Another circumstance in which the courts of equity are called upon
to invoke their inherent power to permit deviations from the express
terms of the trust is where the trust instrument fails to give the trustee
a power of sale, or where such power is specifically denied by the trust
instrument, and an exigency has arisen threatening the destruction of
the trust property.13 Despite such limitations upon the power of
the trustee, it sometimes becomes necessary for the court to permit a
sale of the trust property in order to preserve the estate and protect
the rights of the beneficiaries. This situation is graphically illustrated
by In re Pulitzer's Estate,'4 where the testator bequeathed shares of
stock of the Press Publishing Company in trust for his three sons and
provided further that the shares should not be sold under any cir-
cumstances. It was shown that great losses were being incurred in the
publication of the newspaper with the result that the newspaper would
soon be of no value. Under these circumstances the court authorized
the trustees to sell the assets of the company. But in Security-First
National Bank of Los Angeles v. Easter,15 a California Court of Appeal
took a more restrictive view of what constituted an emergency. In that
case it was shown that the depression had so reduced the income from
the real property that the trustees had been unable to make substan-
tial payments to the beneficiaries for some years. The court declared
that before ordering a sale of real property contrary to the expressed
provisions of the trust "the court should require some showing of the
possibility of a sale for a reasonable price and of the nature and the
security of the proposed investment."' 6
Sometimes a court may permit a trustee to lease or mortgage real
property, even though he may be forbidden to do so by the terms of
the trust.' 7 In Adams v. Cook' s the trust instrument gave the trustee
13American Trust Co. v. Nicholson, 162 N.C. 257, 78 S.E. 152 (1913); Weakley
v. Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S.W. 927 (1917); State v. Undervood, 54 Wyo. 1,
86 P.2d 707 0939).
"139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y. Supp. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), aff'd mem., 237 App. Div.
808, 260 N.Y. Supp. 975 (ist Dep't 1932).
'1 36 Cal. App. 691, 29 P.2d 422 (1934).
Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Easter, 136 Cal. App. 691, 29
P.2d 422, 425 (1934).
173 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 562 at 5oo (1946); 2 Scott, Trusts §§ 189.4 and
191.2 (2d ed. 1956).
u15 Cal. 2d 352, 101 P.2d 484 (1940).
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the power to lease the property, but further provided that any lease
entered into by the trustee would be subject to a subsequent sale of
the property by the trustee under the conditions of the trust. At the
time the trust was created it was not known that there was oil on the
property. After the oil was discovered, the trustee was approached
by several companies seeking oil and gas leases of the premises. The
trustee refused to execute a lease except upon the conditions stated
in the declaration of the trust, and the companies refused to enter into
any lease which was made subject to a subsequent sale of the property.
During the period of this impasse, many wells were being drilled
on adjacent properties with the result that oil was being drained
from beneath the land subject to the trust. To protect the newly dis-
covered oil, go per cent of the beneficiaries brought an action seeking
a modification of the terms of the trust so as to permit the trustees to
enter a lease free of the restrictions set forth by the trust instrument.
The court in directing the trustee to make the lease assumed that the
settlor would have given the trustee such power had he known of
the presence of oil at the time he executed the trust. The court rea-
soned that it was, in effect, merely doing what the settlor himself
would have done had he had the same facts before him at the time of
the creation of the trust. The action of the courts in cases of this gen-
eral nature is usually supported by the rationale that the court is
merely carrying out the implied intent of the settlor. In reality, how-
ever, it would seem that the court is, in fact, creating a new power in
the trustee contrary to the expressed intention of the settlor.19
As a general proposition, the courts will not authorize a deviation
from the express terms of the trust instrument unless there is a show-
ing of an emergency that threatens to destroy or substantially impair
the purposes of the trust.20 Consequently, the courts have uniformly
refused to grant permission to deviate from the terms of the trust
where the sole object of the applicant is to gain a better income for the
present cestui. 21 The decision of the California court in Stanton v.
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.22 would seem to be in
10"Aside from the vice inherent in playing with supposed intention when
none exists, which nearly always produces unhappy results, there is no valid
reason for the position and it seems far more reasonable and certainly more un-
derstandable for the court simply to admit that it is conferring powers on the
trustee contrary to any intent and beyond any contemplation of the settlor because
the unexpected exigencies of the situation demand such action to preserve the
trust and carry out its purpose." Spann, Deviation from the Terms of a Trust, 20
Neb. L. Rev. 133, 134 (1941).
-0In re Tollemache, [19o3] 1 Ch. 457; 54 Am. Jur., Trusts § 284 (1945).
21S Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 561 (1946).
-3io P.2d 1oo (Gal. App. 1957).
